ON THE 24th was fought the battle before the redoubt of Shevardino; —
在24日前,谢瓦尔迪诺纪念碑之前发生了一场战斗; —

on the 25th not a shot was fired on either side; —
在25日,双方都没有开枪; —

on the 26th was fought the battle of Borodino.
在26日,博罗季诺的战斗爆发了;

How and with what object were the battles of Shevardino and Borodino fought? —
战斗谢瓦尔迪诺和博罗季诺的目的和方式是什么? —

Why was the battle of Borodino fought? There was not the slightest sense in it, either for the French or for the Russians. —
为什么要打博罗季诺战斗?无论对于法国人还是俄国人来说,这都毫无意义。 —

The immediate result of it was, and was bound to be, for the Russians, that we were brought nearer to the destruction of Moscow (the very thing we dreaded above everything in the world); —
它的直接结果,也是必然的结果,对俄国来说,我们离莫斯科的毁灭更近了(这也是我们在世界上最害怕的事); —

and for the French, that they were brought nearer to the destruction of their army (which they, too, dreaded above everything in the world). —
而对法国人来说,他们离他们军队的毁灭更近了(这也是他们在世界上最害怕的事)。 —

That result was at the time perfectly obvious, and yet Napoleon offered battle, and Kutuzov accepted it.
这个结果当时是显而易见的,然而拿破仑却发起了战斗,库图佐夫接受了。

If military leaders were guided by reasonable considerations only, it would seem that it must have been clear to Napoleon that in advancing two thousand versts into the heart of the country and giving battle, with the probable contingency of losing a quarter of his men, he was going to certain destruction; —
如果军事领导人只受理性考虑的话,那么拿破仑必须清楚,在进军2000公里进入这个国家的核心地带并进行战斗的情况下,有可能失去四分之一的部队,他注定要灭亡; —

and that it must have been equally clear to Kutuzov that in accepting that battle and risking the loss of a fourth of his army, he would infallibly lose Moscow. —
同样,库图佐夫也必须清楚,在接受这场战斗并冒着失去四分之一的军队的风险的情况下,他肯定会失去莫斯科。 —

For Kutuzov this was mathematically clear, as clear as it is at chess, that if I have one piece less than my adversary and I exchange pieces, I am certain to be a loser by it, and therefore must avoid exchanging pieces. —
对库图佐夫来说,这在数学上是清楚的,就像下棋一样,如果我比对手少一块棋子,并且我们交换棋子,那么我必然会失败,所以我必须避免交换棋子。 —

When my adversary has sixteen pieces and I have fourteen, I am only one-eighth weaker than he; —
当对手有16个棋子而我只有14个时,我只比他弱八分之一; —

but when we have exchanged thirteen pieces, he is three times as strong as I am.
但是当我们交换了13个棋子后,他比我强三倍。

Up to the battle of Borodino our forces were approximately five-sixths of the French, but after that battle they were only one-half—that is, before the battle a hundred thousand against a hundred and twenty thousand, and after the battle fifty thousand against a hundred thousand. —
在博罗季诺战斗之前,我们的军队大致上只有法国军队的五分之六,但在那场战斗之后,我们只有他们的一半,也就是说,战斗之前有10万人对12万人,战斗之后有5万人对10万人。 —

And yet the shrewd and experienced Kutuzov fought the battle. —
然而,精明而经验丰富的库图佐夫进行了战斗。 —

Napoleon, a military genius, as he is called, gave battle, losing a fourth of his army and drawing his line of communications out further than ever. —
拿破仑,作为他被称为的军事天才,发起了战斗,损失了四分之一的军队,并将他的通信线延伸得比以往更远。 —

If we are told that he expected the taking of Moscow to complete the campaign, as the taking of Vienna had done, we may say that there are many evidences to the contrary. —
如果我们被告知他预期攻占莫斯科会完成战役,就像攻占维也纳一样,我们可以说有很多相反的证据。 —

Napoleon’s historians themselves tell us that he wanted to halt as soon as he reached Smolensk; —
拿破仑的历史学家们告诉我们,他希望一到达斯摩棱斯克就停下来; —

that he knew the danger of his extended line, and that he knew that the taking of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he had learned in what condition the towns were left when abandoned to him, and he had not received a single reply to his reiterated expressions of a desire to open negotiations.
他知道他的线路延伸带来的危险,他也知道攻占莫斯科并不意味着战役的结束,因为从斯摩棱斯克他已经得知当城镇被他放弃时留下的状况,而他对他一再表示希望进行谈判的愿望始终没有收到任何回复。

In giving and accepting battle at Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted without design or rational plan. —
在博罗季诺和拿破仑的战斗中,库图佐夫都没有明确的计划或合理的计划。 —

After the accomplished fact historians have brought forward cunningly devised evidences of the foresight and genius of the generals, who of all the involuntary instruments of the world’s history were the most slavish and least independent agents.
在事件发生之后,历史学家们巧妙地提出了将军们的先见之明和天才的证据,而这些将军们在世界历史的无意识工具中,是最为盲从和最不独立的。

The ancients have transmitted to us examples of epic poems in which the whole interest of history is concentrated in a few heroic figures; —
古代将我们传给的史诗般的诗歌例子中,整个历史的兴趣都集中在少数英雄人物上; —

and under their influence we are still unable to accustom our minds to the idea that history of that kind is meaningless at our stage in the development of humanity.
在他们的影响下,我们仍然无法习惯于那种在人类发展的阶段对我们来说是无意义的历史观念。

In answer to the next question, how the battles of Borodino and Shevardino came to be fought, we have also a very definite, well-known, and utterly false account. —
回答下一个问题,博罗季诺和谢瓦尔迪诺的战斗是如何发生的,我们也有一个非常明确,众所周知,且完全错误的说明。 —

All the historians describe the affair thus:
所有的历史学家都这样描述这件事情:

The Russian army, they say, in its retreat from Smolensk sought out the best position for a general engagement, and such a position they found in Borodino. —
他们说,俄军从斯摩棱斯克撤退时寻找了一个最好的总体战的位置,而这样一个位置他们在博罗季诺找到了。 —

The Russians, they say, fortified the position beforehand, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk) at right angles to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, at the very place where the battle was fought.
据说,俄国人事先加固了战斗的位置,在从莫斯科到斯摩棱斯克的公路左侧与之垂直的位置,从博罗季诺到乌季察。

In front of this position, they tell us, a fortified earthwork was thrown up on the Shevardino redoubt as an outpost for observation of the enemy’s movements.
据他们所说,在这个位置前面,他们筑起了一座以舍瓦尔迪诺陵团地为前沿,用以观察敌人动向的防御工事。

On the 24th, we are told, Napoleon attacked this redoubt, and took it. —
据说,纳瓦伦在24日攻击了这座陵团地,并夺取了它。 —

On the 26th he attacked the whole Russian army, which had taken up its position on the plain of Borodino.
在26日,他攻击了整个被驻扎在博罗季诺平原上的俄国军队。

This is what we are told in the histories, and all that is perfectly incorrect, as any one may easily see who cares to go into the matter.
这就是历史书中所说的,而这一切完全都是错误的,只要有人对此事感兴趣,很容易就能看出来。

The Russians did not seek out the best position; —
俄国人并没有寻找最好的阵地; —

on the contrary, on their retreat they had passed by many positions better than Borodino. —
相反,在撤退时,他们经过了许多比博罗季诺更好的位置。 —

They did not make a stand at one of these positions, because Kutuzov did not care to take up a position he had not himself selected, because the popular clamour for a battle had not yet been so strongly expressed, because Miloradovitch had not yet arrived with reinforcements of militia, and for countless other reasons.
他们没有在其中一个位置上坚持下去,是因为库图佐夫并不愿意占据他自己未选择的阵地,因为对于战斗的呼声还没有如此强烈地表达出来,因为米洛拉多维奇还没有带着民兵的增援到达,还有无数其他原因。

The fact remains that there were stronger positions on the road the Russian army had passed along, and that the plain of Borodino, on which the battle was fought, is in no respect a more suitable position than any other spot in the Russian empire to which one might point at hazard on the map.
事实上,沿着俄国军队经过的这条道路上有更强大的阵地,而且博罗季诺平原,战斗发生的地方,在俄国帝国的其他任意位置,指在地图上随意指的任何地方相比,都没有更合适的位置。

Far from having fortified the position on the left at right angles to the road—that is the spot on which the battle was fought—the Russians never, till the 25th of August, 1812, dreamed of a battle being possible on that spot. —
相反,俄国人直到1812年8月25日,从没有梦想在那个位置进行一场战斗。 —

The proof of this is, first, that there were no fortifications there before the 25th, and that the earthworks begun on that day were not completed by the 26th; —
证据首先在于,该位置在25日之前没有任何防御工事,而25日开始兴建的地堡到26日并未完成; —

and, secondly, the Shevardino redoubt, owing to its situation in front of the position on which the battle was actually fought, was of no real value. —
其次,舍瓦尔迪诺陵团地由于其位置在实际战斗地点前面,没有真正的价值。 —

With what object was that redoubt more strongly fortified than any of the other points? —
这个防御工事比其他所有位置都更加坚固。 —

And with what object was every effort exhausted and six thousand men sacrificed to defend it till late at night on the 24th? —
为了保卫它,直到24日深夜,每一次努力都被耗尽,六千人的生命也被牺牲了。 —

A picket of Cossacks would have been enough to keep watch on the enemy’s movements. —
派一支哥萨克哨兵就足够了,来监视敌人的动向。 —

And a third proof that the position of the battlefield was not foreseen, and that the redoubt of Shevardino was not the foremost point of that position, is to be found in the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration were, till the 25th, under the impression that the Shevardino redoubt was the left flank of the position, and that Kutuzov himself, in the report written in hot haste after the battle, speaks of Shevardino as the left flank of the position. —
还有一个证据表明,战场位置没有被预见到,希瓦尔迪诺红oubt并不是那个位置的前沿点,这在于巴尔克-德托利和巴格拉季昂都在25日之前都以为希瓦尔迪诺红oubt是位置的左翼,而库图佐夫本人在战斗后匆忙写的报告中,把希瓦尔迪诺看作是位置的左翼。 —

Only a good time later, when reports of the battle were written at leisure, the incorrect and strange statement was invented (probably to cover the blunders of the commander-in-chief, who had, of course, to appear infallible) that the Shevardino redoubt served as an advance post, though it was in reality simply the fortified point of the left flank, and that the battle of Borodino was fought by us on a fortified position selected beforehand for it, though it was in reality fought on a position quite unforeseen, and almost unfortified.
只有很长一段时间之后,当路透报道以悠闲的方式写出后,才发明了不正确和奇怪的陈述(可能是为了掩盖当然要表现得毫无错误的总司令的错误),即希瓦尔迪诺红oubt作为前哨,尽管其实它只是左翼的防御点,并且波罗底诺战斗是在预先选择的防御位置上进行的,尽管其实它是在一个几乎没有防御工事的未预见位置上进行的。

The affair obviously took place in this way. —
事情显然是这样发生的。 —

A position had been pitched upon on the stream Kolotcha, which intersects the high-road, not at a right angle, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was at Shevardino, the right near the village of Novoe, and the centre at Borodino, near the confluence of the Kolotcha and the Voina. Any one looking at the plain of Borodino, and not considering how the battle actually was fought, would pick out this position, covered by the Kolotcha, as the obvious one for an army, whose object was to check the advance of an enemy marching along the Smolensk road towards Moscow.
一个位置被选择在Kolotcha河上,这条河与高速公路交叉,不是以直角,而是以锐角,所以左翼位于希瓦尔迪诺,右翼位于诺沃耶村附近,而中心位于博罗丁诺,靠近Kolotcha和Voina的交汇处。任何人看着博罗丁诺平原,不考虑实际上战斗是如何进行的,都会选择这个由Kolotcha河掩护的位置,作为一个军队的明显选择,其目标是阻止一支沿Smolensk公路向莫斯科前进的敌军。

Napoleon, riding up on the 24th to Valuev, did not (we are told in the histories) see the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodino (he could not have seen that position since it did not exist), and did not see the advance posts of the Russian army, but in the pursuit of the Russian rearguard stumbled upon the left flank of the Russian position at the redoubt of Shevardino, and, to the surprise of the Russians, his troops crossed the Kolotcha. —
据史书记载,拿破仑骑马于24日接近瓦利耶夫时,并未看到俄军在乌提察到博罗金诺之间的阵势(因为这个阵势并不存在),也未发现俄军先头部队的存在,但是在追击俄军后卫时,他偶然遭遇了俄军左翼在谢瓦尔迪诺红oubt上的阵地,令俄军大为惊讶的是,拿破仑的部队越过了科洛奇河。 —

And the Russians, since it was too late for a general engagement, withdrew their left wing from the position they had intended to occupy, and took up a new position, which had not been foreseen, and was not fortified. —
由于当时已经过晚,无法进行总体战斗,俄军从原本计划占据的阵地上撤退了左翼,并且选址了一个无人预料到的,未加固的新阵地。 —

By crossing to the left bank of the Kolotcha, on the left of the road, Napoleon shifted the whole battle from right to left (looking from the Russian side), and transferred it to the plain between Utitsa, Semyonovskoye and Borodino—a plain which in itself was a no more favourable position than any other plain in Russia—and on that plain was fought the whole battle of the 26th.
挨过科洛奇河,位于道路左边的拿破仑将整个战斗由右向左(从俄军方向来看),并将其转移到乌提察、谢蒙诺夫斯科耶和博罗金诺之间的平原上- -这个平原本身并不比俄罗斯的其他平原位置更为有利- -并且在这个平原上发生了整个26日的战斗。

Had Napoleon not reached the Kolotcha on the evening of the 24th, and had he not ordered the redoubt to be attacked at once that evening, had he begun the attack next morning, no one could have doubted that the Shevardino redoubt was the left flank of the Russian position; —
若拿破仑并未在24日傍晚抵达科洛奇河,并且没有命令立即攻打红oubt,若他在次日早上开始进攻,无人会怀疑谢瓦尔迪诺红oubt是俄军阵地的左翼。 —

and the battle would have been fought as we expected. —
并且战斗将会如我们预期的那样展开。 —

In that case we should probably have defended the Shevardino redoubt by our left flank even more obstinately; —
在那种情况下,我们可能会更为顽强地以我们的左翼来保卫谢瓦尔迪诺红oubt; —

we should have attacked Napoleon in the centre or on the right, and the general engagement would have been fought on the 24th on the position prepared and fortified for it. —
我们会在中央或右翼进攻拿破仑,总体战斗将会在24日按预先为之准备和加固的阵地上展开。 —

But as the attack was made on our left flank in the evening after the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the action at Gridnevo, and as the Russian generals would not, or could not, begin the general engagement on the evening of the 24th, the first and most important action of the battle of Borodino was lost on the 24th, and that loss led inevitably to the loss of the battle fought on the 26th.
但是,由于袭击发生在我们的左翼,紧接着我们后卫的撤退,也就是在格里德涅沃战斗之后的晚上,而且俄罗斯将领们不愿意或无法在24日晚上开始总体战斗,所以波罗地那战役的首要和最重要的行动在24日就已经失败了,而这个失利不可避免地导致了在26日的战斗的失利。

After the loss of the Shevardino redoubt, we found ourselves on the morning of the 25th with our left flank driven from its position, and were forced to draw in the left wing of our position and hurriedly fortify it were we could.
在失去谢瓦尔迪诺 redoubt 后,我们发现自己在25日早上,我们的左翼被逼离了原位,并被迫收缩我们的左翼阵地,并匆忙巩固我们能够巩固的地方。

So that on the 26th of August the Russian troops were only defended by weak, unfinished earthworks, and the disadvantage of that position was aggravated by the fact that the Russian generals, not fully recognising the facts of the position (the loss of the position on the left flank, and the shifting of the whole field of the coming battle from right to left), retained their extended formation from Novoe to Utitsa, and, consequently, had to transfer their troops from right to left during the battle. —
因此,在8月26日,俄罗斯军队只能依靠脆弱而未完成的土工来进行防御,而这个阵地的劣势还被事实进一步恶化(左翼阵地的丧失以及整个战场从右翼转移到左翼),俄罗斯将领们并没有充分认识到这一点,仍然保持着从新河到乌提察的广泛部署,因此他们不得不在战斗中将他们的部队从右翼转移到左翼。 —

Consequently, we had during the whole battle to face the whole French army attacking our left wing, with our forces of half the strength.
因此,我们整个战斗都面对着整个法军向我们的左翼进攻,而我们的部队只有一半的实力。

(Poniatovsky’s action facing Utitsa and Uvarov’s action against the French right flank were quite independent of the general course of the battle.)
(波尼亚托夫斯基在乌提察位置的行动和乌瓦洛夫对抗法军右翼的行动与战斗的总体进程无关。)

And so the battle of Borodino was fought, not at all as, in order to cover the blunders of our commanders, it is described by our historians, whose accounts, consequently, diminish the credit due to the Russian army and the Russian people. —
因此,波罗地那的战斗根本不是为了掩盖我们指挥官的错误而进行的,这也不符合我们历史学家所描述的那样,他们的描述淡化了俄罗斯军队和俄罗斯人民所应得的荣誉。 —

The battle of Borodino was not fought on a carefully picked and fortified position, with forces only slightly weaker on the Russian side. —
波罗地那战役并不是在一个经过精心挑选和加固的阵地上进行的,而且俄罗斯一方的力量只是稍微弱一些而已。 —

After the loss of the Shevardino redoubt, the Russians fought on an open, almost unfortified position, with forces half the strength of the French, that is, in conditions in which it was not merely senseless to fight for ten hours and gain a drawn battle, but incredibly difficult to keep the army for three hours together from absolute rout and flight.
在失去了谢瓦尔迪诺红oubt后,俄军在一个几乎没有设防的开放地形上进行战斗,他们的兵力只有法军的一半,也就是说,他们在一个不仅无意义地奋战十个小时来争取平局的条件下战斗,而且几乎无法在三个小时内阻止被完全击溃和溃逃的军队。